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Abstract
This paper is about the costs of doing business under a harsh, secretive
dictator. In 1949 the Cold War was picking up momentum. The Soviet state
had entered its most secretive phase. The official rationale of secrecy was
defense against external enemies. One of the Gulag’s most important secrets
was the location of its labour camps, scattered across the length and depth of
the Soviet Union. As this secret was guarded more and more closely, the
camps began to drop out of the Soviet economic universe, losing the ability
to share necessary information and do business with civilian persons and
institutions without disclosing a state secret: their own location. For some
months in 1949 and 1950, the Gulag’s camp chiefs and central administrators
struggled with this dilemma and failed to resolve it. This episode teaches us
about the costs of Soviet secrecy and raises basic questions about how
secrecy was calibrated.
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Secrecy, Fear, and Transaction Costs:The Business of Soviet Forced Labourin the Early Cold War
We had to write an essay on “the economic level of security.”
Total security led to paralysis, for only if no one said or did
anything could nothing be given away. Too little security led to
disaster. Where was the golden mean? It was as good, or as
pointless, a subject for debate as the medieval argument
about how many angels could sit on the head of a pin
(Frankland 1999, p. 83; the assignment was part of his training
for the British Secret Intelligence Service in 1958).
A colleague of mine used to quip “Got an access denied?
Good, the security is working.” That means that security
administration is fundamentally opposed to network
administration – they are, in fact, conflicting goals …
Essentially, the tradeoff is between security and usability. The
most secure system is one that is disconnected and locked
into a safe (Johansson 2004).
When it comes to the costs of doing business, it would seem that an autocrat
has many advantages. Leaders that do not have to account for their decisions
may decide without counting costs; in the absence of procedural checks, they
rule by fiat. Democratic leaders, in contrast, must uphold the constitution
that gives them legitimacy, respect checks and balances, listen to public and
private lobbies, build and maintain coalitions of voters, factions, and parties,
ensure transparency of the process that leads to their decisions, and so share
ownership of the decisions that result with others.1 Or, if they do not, they
are likely to pay a price in the loss of office or the ruin of their reputation.
1 “Process,” writes a former permanent secretary in the UK Ministry of
Defence (Quinlan 2004, p. 128), “is care and thoroughness; it is consultation,
involvement and co-ownership; it is (as we were reminded by the failure of
international process in the run-up to the Iraq war) legitimacy and
acceptance; it is also record, auditability and clear accountability. It is often
accordingly a significant component of the outcome itself; and the more
awkward and demanding the issue – especially amid the special gravity of
peace and war – the more it may come to matter.”
2Such considerations make democratic business costly to transact. The
costs are often highly public; they may even be prohibitive. Wintrobe (2000,
pp. 247-279), for example, identifies democracy’s DNZ (“do nothing zone”)
where bargaining fails because the costs and risks of negotiated agreement
are too high.
This paper is about the other side of the coin – a side that we see rarely if
ever because it is normally concealed: the transaction costs of dictatorship. A
dictator reaches decisions in secret. Secrecy frees the dictator from public
accountability and so preserves his freedom of action. Behind the scenes,
secrecy is costly. While the dictator appears to make decisions freely in
person, the administration on which he relies to inform, implement, and
enforce his policies must meet the costs of secrecy.
The costs of secrecy can be of many kinds; in this paper I focus on
transaction costs. Secrecy may affect transaction costs through two channels,
procedural and behavioural. In this paper I consider the behavioural channel.
I use narrative evidence to show that an increase in the level of secrecy led
Soviet officials to change their behaviour in ways that made government
business more costly to transact. Another paper (Harrison 2011c) describes
the procedural channel, estimates the direct burden of secrecy on a small
regional bureaucracy of the Soviet state, the Lithuania KGB, and finds that it
was surprisingly large.
The narrative at the core of this paper is constructed from the records of
the Gulag, the forced labour administration of the Soviet state, not long after
World War II. The scale, scope, and organization of forced labour have been
an important focus of research in formerly secret Russian archives since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Significant histories and documentary
collections on Soviet forced labour are now available, written in English and
Russian from various disciplinary perspectives (Applebaum 2003; Bacon 1994;
Gregory and Lazarev 2003; Khlevniuk 2004; Kozlov 2004/05). This paper is the
first to focus specifically on secrecy in the administration of forced labour.
In the first section of this paper I examine the secret identification and
location of camps in the context of the overall regime of Soviet secrecy. In
the second section I introduce the transaction-cost aspect of secrecy. In the
third section, I narrate the central story of this paper, which transpired in
1949 and is told here for the first time. The fourth section discusses
transaction costs of Soviet administration found in the evidence, and shows
how they were related to secrecy. A final section concludes.1. Forced Labour and Secrecy
Stalin died on March 5, 1953. On March 28, on the initiative of its first deputy
chairman and interior minister Lavrentii Beriia, the USSR Council of Ministers
3ordered the Ministry of the Interior to transfer most forced labour camps and
colonies to the Ministry of Justice (Gorlizki and Khlevniuk 2004, p. 132).
Within a few more weeks, hundreds of establishments and millions of lives
had changed hands.
For this changeover to take place, Justice Ministry officials had to receive
some sort of account of the assets for which they would become responsible.
Of many questions they might have had about these camps and colonies, the
simplest were: Where are they? What are they called?
In Moscow the secretariat of Gulag (the interior ministry chief
administration of labour camps) compiled lists and maps. Roughly speaking,
there was one list and one map for each of the 150 or so provinces and
republics of the Soviet Union at the time. Every map was drawn in pen and
pencil by an anonymous hand. Roads, railways, rivers, and coasts were
traced. Installations were symbolized and place names were artfully
lettered.2
The inference is unmistakable: the Gulag had no printed maps. Why not?
It is true that the Soviet Union was a poor country, and maps that were
accurate enough to be useful were no doubt costly to produce and
reproduce. Were they too costly? This was surely not the case.
Russia had a long tradition of print cartography. According to the website
of the Russian National Library, map-printing “began and came of age” in
Russia already in the eighteenth century.3 In Russian history, when maps
were needed, they were produced. Alexander I created the Imperial Army
corps of topographers in 1812. In 1914 the Russian Army entered World War
I with a stock of 30 million printed maps of the border districts of the Empire
and its neighbours. In 1941 the Red Army’s early defeats cost it a stockpile of
100 million maps (Losev and Kazakov 1992). By this time, fortunately, Red
Army formations had “embedded” topographical units fully equipped with
mobile map stores and printing facilities. After the chaos of 1941, despite the
fact that much of the war was fought over vast interior spaces of the country
that prewar thinking had considered invulnerable, each major operation saw
the production of many millions of maps of various scales and their
2 Hoover/GARF, fond R-9414, op. 1, files 119 to 205 contain these
documents (also catalogued in Kozlov 2005, vol. 6, p. 94). Some are dated
before 1953, suggesting preparation prior to Stalin’s death; Beriia is known to
have planned a fundamental reform of the Gulag but was prevented while
Stalin lived (Tikhonov 2003).
3 See “Russian Maps and Atlases in the National Library of Russia” at
http://www.nlr.ru/eng/coll/maps/rus_map.html (accessed September 30,
2010).
4distribution to the troops, including specialized maps for different branches
of the armed forces (Voronkov and Zakuvaev 1982).
In short, Stalin’s bureaucracy was certainly capable of supplying maps
when required. If the Gulag had no maps, it is because they were not wanted.
Maps were not wanted because the identity and location of camps were
among the top state secrets of the Soviet era.
How did this come to be so? The existence of forced labour was not,
initially, a Soviet secret. As of 1927, for example, a comprehensive list of state
secrets did not include labour camps (Bone 1999, pp. 81-83). It did classify as
“secret,” under “matters of a military nature,” “The dislocation in toto of
every category of institution and establishment (for example, … all
institutions of higher learning …, all warehouses, etc.).” According to these
rules a comprehensive list of labour camps would have been classified a
military secret, but labour camps were not singled out for this, and it was not
forbidden to reveal the location of any one forced labour facility in particular.
In fact, in the early 1930s the Soviet press published various accounts of
life behind the wire. The writer Maksim Gor’kii, for example, contributed
stories about rehabilitation by forced labour in camps of the far northern
Solovetskii islands, the Moscow suburb of Liubertsy, and the White Sea canal
project (cited respectively by Davies 1996, p. 36, and Applebaum 2003, pp.
59-62, and 80-82). At this time, therefore, the existence of particular labour
camps was not secret, although the conditions under which they operated
were heavily sanitized.
Already, however, the fact that something was not listed as secret did not
mean that just anyone could freely know it or repeat it. The statistics of
forced labour were secret de facto at this time, as well as the laws governing
its use (Davies 1989, p. 35). In the depth of the Great Depression, moreover,
there was an international outcry against the Soviet export of commodities
produced by forced labour (Davies 1989, p. 395; Applebaum 2003, pp. 74-76).
A self-reinforcing cycle of simultaneous causation ran from Soviet secrecy on
this sensitive matter to anti-Soviet sentiment in the world outside and back
again.
After the depression the campaign against Soviet exports died away, but
the Gulag was increasingly hidden. Official propaganda of the benefits of
“corrective labour” ceased. The works that were previously published were
banned, and many of their authors were arrested. Concealment was
complete by 1937 (Applebaum 2003, p. 110). There were no more accounts
of life behind the wire until 1962, when Alexander Solzhenitsyn was allowed
to publish his fictional account of One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, set in
an unnamed Siberian labour camp. This window into Soviet reality was soon
5closed again, and the full facts were held back for a further thirty years. Until
the 1990s, ample scope remained for speculation and error.4
The Soviet Union was already one of the most secretive states in the
world before World War II broke out. At the war’s end, there were
widespread hopes that victory would be rewarded by relaxation and a return
to more open or even “normal” political and cultural relations (Hough 1985).
These hopes were eventually dashed. The fog of secrecy became even more
impenetrable on June 9, 1947 with a Supreme Soviet decree “On
responsibility for the disclosure of state secrets and for the loss of documents
containing state secrets.” Its occasion was the “KR” affair – a scandal
whipped up around a Soviet husband-and-wife team of biological scientists,
Nina Kliueva and Grigorii Roskin, who had shared preliminary results of their
research on anti-cancer agents with American specialists (Esakov and Levina
1994). Kliueva and Roskin were accused of violating secrecy and betraying
the interests of the Soviet state to American intelligence for the sake of
“personal fame.” In the second half of 1947, hundreds of closed meetings
were held in party organizations and government ministries to condemn
them. But they were not charged with spying or arrested, a sign of how times
had changed since 1937.
The 1947 law was aimed at offenses that fell short of espionage or
treason, for which the most severe penalties were already available.5
Discussing the new law in a draft for Pravda (published on September 27,
1947), the USSR State Prosecutor Konstantin Gorshenin pointedly began with
some exemplary cases in which offenders were sentenced to four or more
years of forced labour, not because they were traitors, but because they lost
secret documents through negligence. In this postwar narrative there were
spies, but these were foreign rather than home grown. Foreign intelligence
agencies, Gorshenin suggested, were predators in search of a “habitat” with
“willing or unwilling prey.” He claimed that they found their victims especially
among those citizens “in whose consciousness such relics of the past as a
4 Bacon (1994) surveys the pre-1991 literature. The most reliable clues
were contained in secret sections of the Soviet national economic plan for
1941, seized by German forces during World War II and later published in the
United States. The 1941 plan was exploited by Jasny (1951) for an evaluation
that turned out remarkably close to the figures revealed in the 1990s.
5 Thus the downfall of Nikolai Voznesenskii, the wartime economic chief
and once Stalin’s favourite, was triggered in March 1949 by a scandal over
the negligent loss of secret papers in Gosplan, but his subsequent execution
in August was for treason and undermining the economy under the RSFSR
Criminal Code, Article 58 (Gorlizki and Khlevniuk 2004, pp. 83-89).
6self-centred attitude to social causes, non-ideological, narrow-minded
interests, an egotistical drive towards cheap personal fame, adulatory self-
abasement before bourgeois culture, and so forth, are still strong.” Also open
to foreign manipulation were “those who, out of their own generosity, trust
everyone and anyone, and fail to reckon the cost of their generosity to the
interests of the state.” Only vigilance could frustrate the imperialists’ designs,
seen in this light.6
The implementation of the law of June 9, 1947, provided the exogenous
shock to the secrecy regime that yields our data. As a result of the new law,
security was tightened further throughout the Soviet bureaucracy. The law
prohibited disclosure of a long list of matters, ending with “other information
that will be recognized by the USSR Council of Ministers as not subject to
disclosure.” The Council of Ministers followed this up on March 1, 1948, with
new lists of classified information and new instructions for all aspects of
handling information of all kinds and all degrees of secrecy.7
The instructions ran to 47 printed pages. Their spirit was to add a rule to
cover every past violation.”8 The document covered all levels of classification
but was itself classified “top secret”; this meant that those cleared for access
to documents that were merely “secret” could not read about their new
obligations. Among government officials it was a particular fear that matters
such as plan figures, released a few months previously and already in the
public domain, might now be considered secret, making it an offence under
the law to repeat them in public (Gorlizki 2002, pp. 722-723).
The change in the law had implications for every part of the Soviet
bureaucracy. The leaders of the Gulag followed through within a few days by
issuing a new list that itemized the Gulag’s secrets. First on the list was: “The
6 Hoover/GARF, R-9492/1a/513, folios 8-18 (“Soobshchenie prokuratura
Soiuza SSR”).
7 Hoover/GARF, R-9492/2/79, folios 2-26 (“Instruktsiia po obespecheniiu
sokhraneniia Gosudarstvennoi tainy v uchrezhdeniiakh i na predpriiatiiakh
SSSR,” Moscow, 1948).
8 Thus typists were instructed not to discuss the content of secret
documents with others, to consult only their seniors or the author of the
document about illegible words, not to take dictation where they could be
overheard, and to hand all waste paper to their seniors for destruction.
Hoover/GARF, R-9492/2/79, folio 19ob.
7location of corrective-labour and verification-filtration camps, colonies,
deportation prisons, and other Gulag subsections.”92. Transaction Costs and Secrecy
The repercussions of the “KR” affair are consistent with the use of secrecy as
an instrument that raises the costs of unauthorized transactions (Harrison
2005, 2008a). How does it work? Information is valuable both in itself and
when it is shared to facilitate value-adding exchange. Controlling information
is therefore one way of regulating exchange.
Regulated exchange was fundamental to the working of the Soviet
planned economy. Exchange was fundamental because parallel ministerial
hierarchies, unified at the top in the Politburo and Council of Ministers, were
specialized at lower levels by facility, function, technology, and territory. In
order to function at the lower levels, the managers of specialized facilities
had to trade resources with other ministries, with households and
cooperatives, and, through state intermediaries, with foreign corporations
and agencies. Regulation from above was designed to ensure that agents at
lower levels undertook only authorized (“planned”) trade. This was necessary
because lower level agents faced many potential exchanges that would be
privately profitable at the cost of diverting resources from plan objectives.
Legally enforceable plans were designed to rule these out.
Every diversion of resources from planned uses to unauthorized sideline
trading represented a risk of loss to the state.10 This is what the “KR” affair
9 Hoover/GARF, R9414/1/335, folios 11-12 (“List of questions of the work
of the GULAG of the USSR MVD and its peripheral organs that are state
secrets (gosudarstvennaia taina),” signed by acting Gulag chief Dobrynin,
June 17, 1947). Applebaum (2003, p. 110) notes that “subsection” was an
internal codeword for a labour camp. On December 10, 1951, USSR interior
minister Kruglov issued a similar “List of questions of special importance
(osoboi vazhnosti) about the GULAG of the USSR MVD, correspondence
about which should be classified ‘top secret (special file)’ (Sovershenno
sekretno (osobaia papka)” (Hoover/GARF, R9414/1/335, folios 71-72). Items
2 and 3 were “The location and information about numbers of the Gulag
contingents engaged in the construction of especially important closed
special construction projects of Glavpromstroi” (a reference to the newly
founded Soviet atomic weapons industry) and “Summative information on
the location of corrective labour camps and colonies and transit prisons of
the USSR MVD.” Item no. 1 was “Summative information on the overall
number of the contingent of prisoners maintained in all MVD camps
(including special camps) and colonies, their physical condition and labour
utilization”; this was the second item in the 1947 list.
8meant to Stalin, and it is why he reacted to it so sharply. Secrecy was then a
means of reducing such losses by raising the expected costs that
subordinates would face if they exchanged information that was valuable
directly or indirectly to potential partners on the side.
Each extra degree of secrecy created an important dilemma, or trade-off,
for the Soviet authorities. This is because, while raising the costs of
unauthorized transactions that fell outside the plan, additional secrecy also
promised to raise transaction costs of the command system itself. This trade-
off matters if we think of the dictator as aiming to maximize payoffs, net of
transaction costs. By implication, the dictator had an interest in transacting
business efficiently.
The Soviet command system incurred significant transaction costs.
According to Hayek (1945), such costs must have exceeded those of a market
economy, because markets share information more economically than a
hierarchy. These costs were incurred in both the vertical and horizontal
dimensions of hierarchy. In the vertical dimension, there were decision costs:
the information and deliberation costs of making decisions in high level
committees and enforcing or adapting them in the face of indifference,
criticism, self-interested resistance, or objective obstacles. In the horizontal
dimension were trade costs: the resources consumed in order for agents at
lower levels to assure each other and those watching them from above that
the exchanges that they sought were consistent with higher level plans.
How then would secrecy cause these costs to vary? We consider three
effects.
A. Agreements for the sequential exchange of goods or services for
money or other considerations depend on the parties knowing each
other’s identity, address, legal status, and ability to supply or sell.
Secrecy limited state agents’ access to unauthorized sideline options
by criminalizing the provision of such information to outsiders and its
acquisition by them. Other things being equal, agents faced with
lower returns from sideline trading could be expected to switch effort
and resources back into the state sector, increasing the value of the
dictator’s objective function.
10 “Risk of loss,” rather than certain loss, because even loyal managers
frequently had to trade on the side, without authorization, in order to fulfil
the plan. It was intrinsically difficult for the authorities to draw a line
between the unauthorized exchanges that were plan-oriented (or loyal) and
those that were profit-oriented (and disloyal). Kliueva and Roskin, for
example, persistently protested their loyalty. For further discussion, see
Gregory and Harrison (2005).
9B. While pushing up the costs of unauthorized sideline trade, secrecy
could also raise authorized trade costs within the state sector by
criminalizing information sharing and complicating verification among
loyal agents who were just trying to follow instructions. Resources
would be consumed by this, and some authorized contracts would be
so impeded that they would be left unfulfilled. This effect of secrecy
on transaction costs is reflected in today’s information systems
literature on security versus usability (Johansson 2004). The dictator
would lose from this effect.
C. A further effect was associated with Stalinist regulatory regime shifts
rather than with secrecy as such. This was an increase in decision
costs, which are also a cost of transactions. New laws were often
accompanied by stringent enforcement campaigns based on
exemplary punishment of offenders (Gorlizki 1999; Heinzen 2004;
Harrison 2011a). It was in the same spirit that Kliueva and Roskin
were pilloried in 1947, and Gorshenin’s offenders were sentenced to
the camps. The result was a state of fear, arising from uncertainty
among government officials and managers about how the new regime
would be applied, and to whom, and what punishments might follow.
Managers and officials responded to such threats by avoiding
decisions, for which they might be held responsible, as well as pooling
risks and covering each others’ backs (Gregory and Harrison 2005). If
they responded to additional secrecy by withdrawing from sideline
activities, therefore, they did not necessarily put more effort into the
plan because they would divert some into self-protection.
Where would the dictator stand in terms of net gain or loss? This
discussion is easily formalized and turns out to resemble the general case of a
security versus usability tradeoff. Consider an economy with potential output
fixed at ݔҧ. Output is delivered to the dictator after deducting sideline losses ݏ
(from sharing and stealing for sideline trade), so available output is ݔҧെ ݏ.
The dictator then pays transaction costs t, leaving a net revenue of
ݎؠ ݔҧെ ݏെ ݐ, and this is what he must maximize.
The level of secrecy, continuously variable as ߪǡis the dictator’s
instrument. Suppose sideline losses are diminishing in secrecy, but at a
diminishing rate, so ݏᇱ(ߪ) < 0, ݏᇱᇱ(ߪ) < 0; transaction costs are increasing in
secrecy at an increasing rate, so ݐᇱ(ߪ) > 0, ݐᇱᇱ(ߪ) > 0. Then, the dictator’s
revenue is maximized where ݏᇱൌ ݐᇱ. In Figure 1, the upper horizontal line is
potential output. The output above the ݔҧെ ݏcurve is diverted into sideline
losses and that below the t curve is lost in transaction costs. The gap between
the curves is available to the dictator, whose optimum is found by fixing
10
secrecy where the curves are parallel and the vertical gap is at its widest. At
σ*, the marginal gain from tighter security is equal to the marginal loss from
more costly transactions. Here, secrecy is just right; elsewhere, it is too weak
or too extreme.
Figure 1. Optimizing Secrecy
Our empirical evidence comes from a single episode in the history of a
particular bureaucracy, the Soviet administration responsible for forced
labour camps, in 1949/50. It is a limitation of the evidence that it supports a
narrative but is not amenable to measurement. It is not a natural experiment,
because no group went untreated. It tells us nothing about other payoffs that
might have been sought from secrecy, or whether or not they were
commensurate with the costs. Despite such limitations, this paper provides
the first account, based on historical evidence, of transaction costs of a
change in the regime of official secrecy in any country.11
11 That’s a challenge to the reader. Counter-examples are welcome;
please send them to mark.harrison@warwick.ac.uk. In economics there is an
extensive literature on information, reviewed by Stiglitz (2000). This
literature has much to say about information costs, and about collective and
individual choices over concealment and disclosure, notably in corporate
governance and monetary regulation. It is silent, however, on the value of
artificial secrecy, when information would be relatively freely observable,
except for the fact that the ruler chooses to penalize its disclosure by law.
Secrecy, σ
Output, x
Potential output, ̅ݔ
Available output ̅ݔ− ݏ
Transaction costs, ݐ
σ* 
Sideline losses
Transaction costs
Net revenue
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The evidence does not let us observe the optimum; in fact, we will not be
able to rule out the possibility that, when he intensified secrecy, Stalin made
a mistake. The one thing we will observe is the sign of the slope of the t
function. Thus, identifying the relationship between secrecy and transaction
costs is the contribution of this paper.
As a final preliminary, I address the issue of whether an optimization
model is appropriate to Stalin’s political economy. From the 1920s to the
1950s the Soviet command system was ruled by a totalitarian dictator whose
rationality is often questioned. Sebag Montefiore’s (2003, pp. 48-49)
biography describes Stalin as a victim of “paranoia.” Filtzer (2010, p. 18)
refers to the “mindless, excessive secrecy” of the postwar years. Indeed,
historians often seem easier with the idea that Stalin blundered
uncontrollably than that he calculated.
Intellectual resistance to the proposition that Stalin sought to optimize
secrecy is natural but mistaken. There is plentiful evidence of Stalin’s
psychopathology (e.g. Conquest 1971, p. 114; Medvedev 1971, p. 306; Tucker
1974, 1992; Bullock 1993, p. 494; Service 2004, pp. 343-344). Damaged by
childhood abuse, Stalin had few scruples, few friends, and a limited capacity
for empathy. At the same time he had superior talents for organizing
information and reasoning logically. He excelled at the patient, step-by-step
argumentation of syllogisms. In speeches and letters he advanced complex,
consistent models of cause and effect in the world. He showed patience and
persistence in the pursuit of long term objectives, whether we construe these
as personal or political. With this went a high degree of self control, including
the ability to wait. He controlled his feelings, rarely allowing himself to
express self-doubt, depression, or despair. Even if he lacked empathy, he had
insight and was able to dominate and manipulate others.
Stalin could rationalize; could he also optimize? In some instances,
Stalin’s policy decisions have been thought to suggest unstable or
inconsistent preferences. These include choices over investment and
consumption, and over mass killing and selective repression. In both cases,
however, economically minded historians have shown that Stalin’s behaviour
is consistent with optimization subject to constraints; when the constraints
changed, so did his choices. Stalin favoured investment over consumption
when possible, but returned the priority to consumption when intelligence
reports warned him that he risked violating the workers’ fair wage constraint
(Gregory 2004; Gregory and Harrison 2005). He preferred selective
repression when possible, but switched to mass killing when internal threats
became less well defined (making selection more difficult) and when external
threats increased (making the neutralization of internal threats more urgent)
(Harrison 2008b, 2011b; Gregory et al. 2011). New work by Markevich (2011)
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points in the same direction: In his general approach to business, Stalin
aimed for efficient control, not for control at all costs.
While the dictator had an interest in doing business efficiently, the
command system did not exist to be efficient, and it could not calibrate or
compute many of the values required for full optimization. If Stalin
optimized, he did it intuitively, by trial and error. His attention and capacity
for work deteriorated, moreover, after 1945 (Gorlizki and Khlevniuk 2004), so
that he increasingly left important decisions to subordinates. For all these
reasons, we should think of optimization as a hypothesis, not a presumption.
A further reason to retain a critical attitude to the idea of optimizing
secrecy can be seen in Figure 1. This diagram is just a visual metaphor, but
suppose for a moment that it literally represents reality. If so, if the optimum
existed, and if Stalin aimed broadly to achieve it, even a small amount of
measurement error or non-maximizing behaviour could lead to a relatively
large deviation from the optimal allocation. This is because the curves are
parallel at the optimum, and their slopes diverge only slowly as secrecy
becomes suboptimal or superoptimal (for more general discussion see
Akerlof and Yellen 1985).3. A Matter of Special Importance
The story that follows is taken from a single file in the collection of the USSR
MVD (interior ministry) chief administration of places of confinement. The
narrative begins in the spring of 1949 and concludes more than a year later. It
is a story without drama. There is no excitement, no suspense, no revelation,
no reversal, and not even a dénouement. All the personalities are grey. The
emotions are fear and frustration. When the evidence runs out, these
feelings have not been discharged; at best, they have been normalized.
The labour camps of the Gulag were not self-sufficient. They had to
undertake everyday transactions with civilian suppliers and purchasers, with
the railways that shipped supplies to and from the camps, and with the state
banking system that recorded debits and credits for camp purchases and
receipts. According to our story, in 1949 and 1950, bilateral transactions
between the Gulag and its civilian environment began to break down.
Reading between the lines, one infers that the breakdown was more
threatened than realized; it would have become fully actual, only if all those
involved from top to bottom had stuck rigidly to formal rules. Instead, a
complete breakdown was avoided to some extent by working around the
rules or ignoring them to some degree.
The existence of a gap between rules and realities was not unique to this
moment or this context. In fact, rigid adherence to the rules might have
made the entire Soviet system unworkable. All Soviet managers were
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compelled to break rules in order to do their job, even when all they wanted
was to be left alone to “sleep peacefully” (Berliner 1957). Their skill lay in
knowing which rules to break, and by how much.
The evidence of our story is that Soviet managers saw the gap between
secrecy rules and realities as particularly dangerous. It produced more than
the usual amount of fear. For this reason, although they were willing to work
around the rules to some extent, they also took steps to insure themselves
against the potentially severe legal consequences of their own actions.
Insurance involved two activities, both directed towards their superiors. One
was prompt disclosure of the illegal actions they were being forced to
undertake; this implicated their superiors in joint responsibility either for rule
breaking or for the plan breakdown that would follow from full compliance.
The other was to invest significant time and effort in lobbying superiors for
the rules to be adapted to reality.
Background
Labour camps were given different addresses and designations for different
purposes. Specifically, every camp had a “full” or “effective designation”
(polnoe or deistvitel’noe naimenovanie) and one or more “conventional
designations” (uslovnoe naimenovanie).
The purpose of the conventional designation was to avoid disclosure of
the full designation and address. The conventional designation was for non-
secret use, most commonly in providing release certificates, enabling
personal correspondence between prisoners and their relatives, and in
personal correspondence with camp officers and hired employees. While
concealment of the full designation and address was the first objective of
security, it was particularly important also to avoid disclosing the
concordance between full and conventional designations.
Volzhlag, also known as Volgolag (and before that Volgostroi), provides an
example. The full designation of this camp was Volzhskii ITL MVD (the MVD
Volga Corrective Labour Camp), opened in 1946 and transferred in April 1953
to the Iaroslavl’ provincial MVD administration.12 The camp’s full address was
“Perebory village, Rybinsk ward (raion), Iaroslavl province (oblast’).” Volzhlag
also had a unique telegraphic address, “Volga.”
Unique letter codes were issued to every camp under MVD decree
001542 of December 25, 1945; for Volzhlag, high in the Russian alphabet, it
was “E”; camps lower down the list had codes with two or three letters.
12 The Memorial website entry under “Volzhskii ITL MVD” at
http://www.memo.ru/history/nkvd/gulag/r3/r3-63.htm (accessed September
30, 2010), provides these and following details.
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Camps were issued with letter-coded stamps and seals (shtampy i pechati) to
certify releases and correspond with persons such as prisoners’ relatives,
Gulag officers, and hired employees. Stamps tended to be articles of
convenience that substituted for typed or printed letterheads. Circular seals
were more important because without them even signed original documents
had no legal force. At this time, meanwhile, camps continued to use their full
designations in correspondence with state organizations and state
counterparties; they were also issued with stamps and seals giving full
designations in order to authorize and notarize such correspondence and
financial documentation under MVD decree no. 00249 of April 29, 1949.
Finally, mailbox numbers were issued under MVD decree 0035 of January
15, 1949; these were for use in all non-secret correspondence, so as to avoid
fuller identification.13 For Volzhlag, the mailbox address was “Shcherbakov
town, mailbox no. 229.”
Issues
Our story begins on February 15, 1949, when Gulag third administration chief
Volkovyskii forwarded a letter to second administration legal department
chief Liamin. The letter was from Moldavian deputy interior minister
Babushkin to Gulag chief Dobrynin in Moscow.14 It reported that the local oil
industry distributor was refusing orders for fuel from the local Gulag
administration. The reason: these orders were classified secret, as they had
to be, given that the delivery address was a state secret. But under the Soviet
Union’s secrecy regime the fuel supplier was entitled to accept secret orders
only from military units. The camps of the Moldavian Gulag were not military
units, so their orders were returned without being met. The same difficulty
was affecting supplies of meat, grain, and other food products to the camps,
and so was “demoralizing the work of supply.”
A related issue emerged with a letter of April 7 from MVD war supplies
administration chief Gornostaev to deputy interior minister Obruchnikov.15
MVD decree no. 0035-1949 (see above) ordered that labour camps’ non-
secret correspondence should use mailbox numbers as the only form of
designation. This created the following problem. Gosbank, the state bank,
13 Mailbox numbers were first issued, apparently, in 1939, to enable
camps to subscribe to periodical publications without revealing their full
addresses. Hoover/GARF, 9414/1/21, folio 49 (Gulag chief Filaretov, decree
dated January 16, 1939).
14 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folios 1a, 3.
15 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 4.
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held its depositors’ full names and addresses, not mailbox numbers. Gosbank
was now refusing transfers to or from the settlement accounts of labour
camps based on identification by mailbox number, because this did not
match the account details that it held. But full designations were now a state
secret that could not be disclosed to Gosbank, although Gosbank already
held this information in the account details. Payments were being held up
and there was a risk of penalty charges for setting up transfers incorrectly.
A note of August 6 from MVD supply administration Moscow office chief
Slobodkin to Gulag chief Dobrynin widens the frame.16 Slobodkin reported a
general breakdown in the settlement by labour camps of invoices for
equipment and medical supplies. Bank officers were rejecting payments
across the board on the grounds that the payer was insufficiently identified.
Bank records had not been updated to correspond with depositors’ mailbox
numbers. Slobodkin warned Dobrynin, in updating them, to anticipate a
problem. Under MVD regulations it was prohibited to extract information
from secret documents. If the document that Gulag now provided to
Gosbank was a list of camps by mailbox number, labeled “top secret” or
“secret,” it would be illegal to extract the necessary information. Slobodkin
asked Dobrynin “not to delay a solution.”
Time passed, but the mismatch between rules and realities persisted. On
March 9, 1950, for example, Volzhlag chief Kopaev reported to Gulag
secretariat chief Chirkov his anxieties over procedures.17 The root of the
problem, he suggested, was a clash between two MVD decrees. Decree no.
001542-1945 gave every camp a letter-coded designation and letter-coded
stamps and seals to authorize releases and correspond with private persons.
Decree no. 00249-1949 issued stamps and seals giving camps’ full
designations, for correspondence with state organizations and state
counterparties, and to authorize and notarize financial documentation. One
problem arose in mailing non-secret correspondence to other government
agencies. The letter inside was written on paper headed by the full name of
the camp. The envelope, which could be seen by anyone, carried the sender’s
mailbox number and town. Put the two together and you had a state secret.
Similarly, an order issued to an external supplier bore the camp’s mailbox
number, while the authorizing seal gave its full name. Similar issues arose in
dispatching products and making payments. Someone in the secretariat
wrote in the margin: “Comrade Rozenberg. We need to speed up agreement
on the draft decree. March 17, 1950.”
16 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 8.
17 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folios 26-27.
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Recall MVD war supplies administration chief Gornostaev, who wrote first
to deputy interior minister Obruchnikov on April 1949. He appears in the file
twice more, the second time on July 24, 1950, more than a year later, writing
to new deputy interior minister Serov.18 He began by reminding Serov that
the matter was not new. MVD decree no. 0035-1949, he continued, did not
cover the addressing of rail and river shipments and bank transfers. At
present this could be done only by revealing the full names of camps. The
MVD war supplies administration had made proposals, Gornostaev
complained, but the matter remained unresolved. “Given that the disclosure
of the full designation of MVD camps, building sites, and colonies, and their
location is impermissible,” he concluded, “I ask for your instructions to
accelerate the resolution of this question.”
First steps
Overlapping with this process were the first steps towards a possible
resolution. In May 1949, Gulag second administration deputy chief
Nikulochkin reported to Gulag chief Dobrynin that the allocation of mailbox
numbers to camps had given rise to unanticipated difficulties with suppliers
and bank officers.19 He proposed a round of consultations with
counterparties to identify solutions. But consultations would involve the
exchange of information, which required high-level authorization.
Nikulochkin asked Dobrynin to authorize the Gulag’s financial section chief to
visit Gosbank, its transport section chief to visit the transport ministry, and its
quartermaster general to visit the ministry of communications.
These visits evidently took place. On July 1, 1949, MVD transport section
chief Zikeev reported back that the transport ministry did not need to know
details of senders other than mailbox numbers (the report does not discuss
the problem of recipients).20 The MVD transport section could provide the
transport ministry with a daily matrix of shipments by line of origin and
destination. The mailbox numbers of camps had to be known to the MVD
transport section in Moscow, its local sub-offices along the railway lines, and
the station masters. This system already applied to shipments from special-
purpose construction projects, i.e. the secret labour camps of the interior
ministry’s administration for industrial construction, Glavpromstroi.
18 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 42.
19 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 5.
20 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 6.
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Six weeks later, on September 21, Gulag acting chief Bulanov proposed
two options to deputy interior minister Chernyshov.21 He began by reviewing
the current situation: orders for food, clothing, building materials, equipment
and machinery, pharmaceuticals, and published materials, were breaking
down. The orders went to suppliers as top secret, and were being rejected
and returned unfilled. Suppliers required full addresses to fill orders. But to
provide these addresses openly would disclose state secrets. The first option
that Bulanov proposed to Chernyshov was to assimilate relations between
Gulag establishments and civilian counterparties to the rules that the interior
ministry had recently (as of August 6, 1949) applied to the military formations
of its internal security troops. In effect, every camp would be reclassified as
an army unit (voiskovaia chast’) of the MVD. A second option was to re-
register every camp with suppliers and banks as an “MVD facility” (ob”ekt
MVD) with a mailbox number. Either way, private correspondence would
continue to go via existing mailbox numbers.
Bulanov’s memo is followed in the file by two draft decrees for interior
minister Kruglov. The first, “On the introduction of new designations of
corrective labour camps,” approved the nomenclature “MVD facility, mailbox
number XXXX.”22 It authorized camp chiefs to communicate in top secret
their true addresses to deposit holders and railheads, and required them to
prepare new stamps and seals incorporating the new nomenclature.
The second draft decree, “On the procedure for maintaining
correspondence of corrective labour camps and formalization of their
documentation on business and financial operations,” provisionally dated
November 1949 and so most likely prepared separately, approved the
alternative nomenclature “army unit no. XXXX” for all camps, except the
special Glavpromstroi camps.23 According to this draft decree, Gosbank
account holders would register only the army unit number; orders for goods
would specify the unit number and railway line and station. This draft decree
gave authorizations and requirements to camp chiefs that were similar to the
one before, and covered the complexities of secret and private
correspondence in more detail.
At this point the MVD second special section stepped in and became
responsible for carrying the matter forward. On November 26, second special
section chief Filatkin wrote to Gulag chief Dobrynin asking for comments on a
21 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folios 9-13.
22 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folios 12-13.
23 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folios 14-16.
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revised draft decree “On the procedure for maintaining correspondence,”
etc. This document is not in the file, but is evidently a revision of the option
that sanctioned the renaming of camps as “army units.” (the title given is
more or less the same with a few extra words).24 Dobrynin wrote back to
Filatkin on December 7 with minor amendments and corrections to the list of
camps. Dobrynin and Filatkin jointly sent the agreed composite to Kruglov for
signature on December 30.
One step forward, one step back
Kruglov did not sign. On January 20, MVD financial department chief
Karmanov and chief accountant Zaitsev raised objections to the Dobrynin-
Filatkin solution.25 They pointed out that, under a Gosbank instruction of
April 2, 1945, army units could hold only deposit accounts, not settlement
accounts with overdraft facilities. The camps currently held 10.6 billion rubles
of Gosbank credits that they would have to give up; replacing this would be
beyond the budget of the MVD (more evidence, if more is required, that
finance mattered in the Soviet economy). For the proposal to work, Gosbank
and Prombank, the state industrial investment bank, would have to agree to
alter the instructions so that the “army units” of the Gulag could raise
overdrafts.
Almost immediately, this interpretation was confirmed by Gosbank. On
February 4, 1950, financial service state counsellor Borychev wrote to deputy
interior minister Mamulov to make a simple point: Renaming labour camps as
army units would not preserve secrecy.26 “Everyone knows,” he explained
patiently (or was that sarcasm?) that real army units were not funded by
Gosbank. The camps had large funding needs. The discrepancy, he pointed
out, would attract attention and lead directly to what was to have been
avoided: disclosure of the location of camps. It would be better, Borychev
argued, to stick to mailbox numbers on a system like that used by the
defence industry.
These arguments appear powerful and are not contested in the
documentation. Instead, they were ignored. A short background paper from
Gulag second administration chief Matevosov, dated May 1950, for example,
noted that the “army unit” proposal had been current since September when
24 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 17.
25 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 31.
26 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 30.
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Gulag first proposed it to deputy interior minister Chernyshov.27 It envisaged
that, while camps would be renumbered as army units for business purposes,
the system of identifying camps by a letter designation, which originated with
NKVD decree no. 001542-1945 (see above), would be maintained for non-
secret correspondence such as release certificates and correspondence with
private persons.
The MVD leadership met on May 9, 1950. The minutes recorded approval
“in principle” of Filatkin’s draft decree, but also asked the MVD secretariat,
second special department, and legal unit “attentively to review” the issue
together one more time.28 There is no draft decree, but 95 Gulag
establishments are listed by name from “A” to “Ia”, each labeled “Army Unit
no. [space].”29 The list is dated December 1949, so it is evidently part of the
package originally sent to Kruglov at the end of that month (see above). A
sheet attached with a mock letterhead and three seals for correspondence,
financial authorizations, and packages respectively, looks as if it has the same
origin.30 The letterhead followed this template:
МВД СССР 
ВОЙСКОВАЯ ЧАСТЬ 
№ ________ 
_____________ 19 __г. 
№ ________ 
гор. _______ 
MVD USSR
ARMY UNIT
№ ________ 
_____________ 19 __ (year).
№ ________ 
Town ______
The proposal to reclassify labour camps as “army units” was still current
in June 1950, when a draft letter from interior minister Kruglov to war
minister Vasilevskii enquired whether the Soviet Army would object to the
renaming of camps as army units.31 It is not clear whether the letter was ever
sent; no reply is filed. Handwritten across the copy on file are the words:
“Comrades Iatsenko and Filatkin. Examine the draft decree one more time for
report to the minister for signature. June 8 (signature illegible).”
Indecision
At the back of the file are further draft decrees of the interior minister, one
dated 1950 and the other August 1950. The idea of renaming camps as “army
27 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folios 22-23.
28 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 35.
29 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folios 36-40.
30 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 41.
31 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 34.
20
units” had gone. Instead, both decrees were based on Bulanov’s other option
of September 1949: camps were to be renamed “MVD facility” (ob”ekt MVD)
with a four-digit number. The first draft decree is a single page followed by
lengthy “Instructions” and a model letter for each camp to send to its local
Gosbank branch office.32
The instructions are more detailed than in previous draft decrees. A key
clause states: “The location (of camps) is a document of special importance
(osobaia vazhnost’, the highest level of Soviet secrecy) … Reproduction and
duplication are prohibited.” Previous conventional designations, including
letter codes and telegraphic addresses were to be abolished, but mailbox
numbers would be retained. Secret correspondence within the MVD would
use full designations; secret correspondence with other ministries (including
MGB, the security ministry) and non-secret correspondence would use only
facility numbers. The instructions deal with many other contingencies,
including how to deal with camps that are dissolved, newly established, or
moved, and so on.
The last draft decree in the file, dated August 1950 (51-56) again enacts
the “MVD facility” solution.33 Model letters to local railway stationmasters
(57) and bank officials (58) are included. The tone is more practical and
bureaucratic than the preceding draft. Much of the content is similar; two
additions stand out. Paragraph 6(e) deals with prisoners and their relatives:
“Mailboxes of MVD corrective labour and special camps are used only for
letters, transfers, and packages addressed to prisoners. Answers to relatives
of convicts requesting the location of prisoners … are to be given out only
verbally through the information bureau of the first special department …
indicating the mail address of the prisoner’s place of confinement (e.g.
32 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folios 43-50. The model letter is not
without interest. It is written as if from the Mikhailovskii camp chief to the
Sverdslovsk branch office of Gosbank. Headed “Top secret” and “In person
only,” it reads: “I inform (you) that the Mikhailovskii corrective labour camp
of MVD has been given the conventional designation “MVD facility no. 5401.
In connection with this I request (you), from September 1, 1950, to change
the designation of settlement account no. 258 of the Mikhailovskii camp and
rename it: “Settlement account no. 258 of MVD facility no. 5401 in the town
of Sverdlovsk.” In the top left hand corner is a place marker for “Stamp with
full designation of the camp.” The words “with the aim of barring disclosure
of the location of MVD corrective labour camps” are crossed out from the
text of the letter. Too much information, one supposes.
33 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folios 51-58.
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Skvortsov Ivan Petrovich, year of birth 1903, serving punishment – town of
Kotlas, mailbox no. 420).”
And paragraph 3(c) directly addresses the anxieties of Volzhlag chief
Kopaev (voiced in March 1950: see above): “To prohibit the simultaneous use
in a single service correspondence of differently named forms, stamps and
seals of the camp (e.g. application of a seal with the camp’s conventional
name and use of its actual name on signature, etc.).”
Neither the “army unit” nor the “facility” solution was enacted. On July
29, 1950, MVD war supplies administration chief Gornostaev complained –
again – to deputy interior Serov.34 The interior minister, he said, had issued
more decrees: in addition to no. 0035-1949, there was now decree no.
00108-1950. These decrees (not in the file, unfortunately) gave every camp a
mailbox number. The problem, Gornostaev continued, was that nothing had
been implemented. MVD camps and building sites had not revised their bank
account details, so that the MVD war supplies administration remained
unable to debit camps for shipments because the debits were not accepted
by Gosbank; in fact, Gosbank was imposing a 100-ruble penalty for each
incorrect debit. Meanwhile, the war supplies administration had to continue
to use full details of camp names and addresses, since these were what
Gosbank required. Until the matter was resolved, Gornostaev asked
permission to maintain this practice, using the MVD secret courier service
(spetssviaz’).
Decree no. 00108-1950 was not the final resolution. Gulag second
administration chief Matevosov wrote to MVD legal section acting chief
Kurbatov on September 23, 1950, asking him for comments on the draft
decree “On the procedure for maintaining correspondence,” revised after the
May 9, 1950, MVD leadership meeting and still, apparently, pending.35
Triangular seals have been employed that have become unfit for use
In the spring of 1950 a by-play emerges in the file. On March 4, 1950, Unzhlag
chief Ivanov reported to the MVD second special department chief that the
previous November, he had asked the MVD Gor’kii oblast office to allow him
to order numbered circular seals for internal authorizations, and had been
refused on the grounds that MVD had not approved seals for internal use.36
34 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 24.
35 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 66.
36 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folio 71. “Unzhenskii ITL MVD,”
telegraphic address “Unzha”; address “Sukhobezvodnoe station, Gor’kii
province (oblast’)”; mailbox number 242. See the entry under the Memorial
22
Ivanov asked for a ruling that existing approvals could apply or, failing that,
for a new approval. “Up to the present in Unzhlag,” he wrote, “triangular
seals have been employed that have become unfit for use.”
The letter, accompanied by samples of what Ivanov wanted, was passed
from MVD second special department deputy chief Katurkin to MVD
secretariat deputy chief Diukanov and from there to Gulag chief Timofeev.
Unzhlag was a timber camp; six weeks later, on April 26, MVD timber camps
administration deputy chief Sorokin asked MVD secretariat deputy chief
Diukanov to approve the Unzhlag request.37 No decision yet, then.
The Outcome
Nearly one year after Volzhlag chief Kopaev first reported it (above), the
problem of mixing secret and non-secret identities in non-secret
correspondence continued to trouble camp officials. On February 9, 1951,
Bazhenovlag acting chief of administration Golubev asked MVD secretariat
deputy chief Diukanov for urgent clarification of MVD decree no. 0035-1949.
Two months passed before Gulag organization department chief Liamin
replied, on April 4: “A draft decree has been presented to the USSR MVD
leadership on the procedure for correspondence about questions of the
production and business activities of camps. Given a positive decision on this
question, the questions raised by comrade GOLUBEV will find their
solution.”38
On February 27, 1953, the MVD finally issued decree no. 0033-1953
(again, missing from the files), with new rules to resolve the problem of
unintentional disclosure of state secrets in non-secret correspondence.
Provincial MVD administrations reported new mailbox numbers to their
superiors and to bank officials and other counterparties; there was no further
mention of “army units” or “facilities.”39
website at http://www.memo.ru/HISTORY/nkvd/gulag/r3/r3-431.htm
(accessed September 30, 2010).
37 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/145, folios 67, 70, and 73.
38 Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/157, folios 1-2. “Bazhenovskii ITL MVD,”
telegraphic address “Kombinat”; address “Sverdlovsk province (oblast’),
Asbest town”; mailbox number 35 or ED-35. See the entry under the
Memorial website at http://www.memo.ru/history/NKVD/GULAG/r3/r3-
19.htm (accessed June 29, 2011).
39 For example, Hoover/GARF, R-9414/1dop/187, folios 32-33 (Chuvash
ASSR, March 17, 1953); file 204, folios 24-25 (Kaliningrad province, March 10,
1953); file 212, folios 18-19 (Crimea province, March 14, 1953).
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By this time, it would appear, the fear had subsided. As a measure of that,
the files of the party control commission from this period show only two
cases involving the loss of secret documents. One, dated April 1951, involved
deputy minister of the timber and paper industry Izvekov.40 In 1944, as
director of a paper factory in Gor’kii (Nizhnii Novgorod) province, but
temporarily absent, Izvekov should have received a coded telegram from
GOKO, the state defence committee. Until his return, the telegram was held
by the local city party secretary, Morozov. After that, it went missing. Seven
years later, Morozov insisted he had handed it to Izvekov, but admitted he
had failed to get a receipt; Izvekov denied receiving it. These failures were
still significant, for the report of 1951 was addressed directly to A. N.
Poskrebyshev, Stalin’s chief of staff. But there was also forgiveness: the
report gave both Izvekov and Morozov the benefit of the doubt.
Two years passed before another case was filed in June 1953 in
connection with lax accounting for paperwork in the USSR state committee
for supply of food and consumer goods.41 Four secret documents were
missing. In the most favourable outcome, they had been destroyed without
the necessary record being made. Two documents were outstanding on the
account of deputy chairman Rudnitskii, one against former chairman Pavlov
(who blamed his deputy Selivanov), and one against secretary Polievktov
(who blamed the current chairman Rybakov, who blamed inspector of the
secret department Sokolov). Rybakov ended this game of pass-the-parcel by
warning Rudnitskii and Selivanov and reprimanding Polievktov and Sokolov.
These were light penalties, normal and frequent in the bureaucratic career of
any moderate risk-taker. There was no hint of criminal charges.
Six years after the secrecy law of June 9, 1947, the number of complaints
about its impact had fallen away. The officials of the Gulag had evidently
learned to do business in spite of the new regime. Perhaps, through
habituation, they no longer feared it. Stalin was on his way to see Marx. The
Gulag would shrink to a shadow of its former self before disappearing forever
in 1960. But its secrets would be held back for another generation.
40 Hoover/RGANI, 6/6/1575, folios 33-34 (report to Poskrebyshev, signed
by KPK chairman Shkiriatov, April 16, 1951.
41 Hoover/RGANI, 6/6/1650, folios 21-23 (report to KPK chairman
Shkiriatov, signed by responsible controller Byshov, June 1953). The report
responded to a former employee of the state committee who had
complained of mismanagement and various abuses.
244. Effects on Transaction Costs
This story, observed in real time, would be one of maddening tedium. Cut
down to a few paragraphs, it yields basic insights into the trade costs and
decision costs of doing Soviet business when secrecy was tightened.
Trade costs
The evidence of the Gulag in 1949/50 reveals the role of secrecy as an
inhibitor of exchange. The law of June 9, 1947, suddenly intensified secrecy
throughout the Soviet economic and political system. The change was not
instantaneous, because it took many months to implement fully, but it was
surely an unanticipated shock. This shock complicated the relations between
the Gulag and its civilian environment. As a result, trade became more costly;
possibly, some exchanges did not take place at all, although both parties
would have wished to make a contract.
The wider effectiveness of secrecy might be overstated in our documents.
Perhaps the identity and location of many camps was not so much a secret as
an “open secret.” Although they did not have the legal right to such
knowledge, many people might have been perfectly well aware of the
identity and address of many particular camps. While this may be true, it
does not really change the essence of the story about transaction costs. For
some purposes, it is not enough to know something; the knowledge you have
must be verifiable. For example, in writing a contract or making a bank
transfer, you have to be able to assure your own legal identity and/or be
assured of the legal identity of the counterparty. What secrecy legislation did
was to put verifiable knowledge out of reach, and from a transaction-cost
perspective it probably did not matter whether the knowledge was an open
secret or a real secret.
There is irony in this. The contractual parties and counterparties were not
independent buyers and sellers in a real market. They were owned by the
state, were commissioned by the state to operate in an internal market that
the state had created, and were trying to make or complete contracts that
the state had pre-authorized, but the state’s own laws prevented them from
identifying themselves to each other in a way that would let this happen. Or,
if it happened, it was at a higher cost than would have been necessary in the
absence of those laws. Ultimately this cost was paid by the state that made
the internal market and the laws that regulated it.
Notably, it is the authorized trade of the Gulag that was visibly hindered,
involving exchanges that were already approved in state plans for the benefit
of regime goals – the same regime that had enacted the secrecy laws. No
effect was reported on unauthorized trade of the Gulag, where none was
being reported in the first place. Gulag officials were not like scientists; they
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did not have opportunities to meet with foreigners or any incentive to share
information or resources with them, so there was no local parallel with the
“KR” affair. In other words, increased transaction costs in the Gulag were part
of the price that Stalin paid in order to exclude more “KR” affairs elsewhere.
A mitigating factor was the human capacity to normalize changes in the
regime over time. At first, the new secrecy law was frightening. Officials did
not know how it would work and how it might affect them. It took several
years to learn how to work around it and insure against it. Eventually,
however, it became the new “normal.”
Decision costs
The problem of how to do business while keeping camps and their locations
secret, which arose early in 1949, took four years to resolve.
The by-play about the Unzhlag seals shows the same thing. Camps had to
have official seals to function as legal economic entities, but no one could be
found to authorize the ordering and purchase of new seals when old ones
became worn out. Indecision on the major issue became an excuse for delay
on minor matters, however distantly related.
Anyone can be tempted to delay reaching decisions. In the behavioural
literature, procrastination is attributed to undue salience of the costs of
present action relative to future action (Akerlof 1991). Alternatively, complex
organizations can give rise to rational procrastination, because delay allows
individual officials to transfer work pressure or responsibility onto others.
Rose-Ackerman (1986) considers an organization in which jurisdictions
overlap so that a decision can be taken at more than one instance. Here, the
official with a reputation for timely decision making will be overwhelmed by
petitioners. Inaction shifts work pressure onto others. The most applicable
case may be procrastination that passes responsibility for decisions to others.
One example is the tendency of leaders of democracies to leave hard choices
to the next administration (Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira 2007). This would
seem to apply equally to officials in bureaucracies where there is rapid
circulation among posts, allowing difficult decisions to be left to successors.
In our story, Gulag officials did not wish to be held accountable for wrong
decisions, so the safest course was to take no decision and hope that
responsibility could be shifted elsewhere. What were the costs of indecision?
There was a pure time cost, clearly; a decision that would optimally be taken
now was taken later. At the same time the unit cost of a decision that was
subject to delay, measured by the total of committee time and other
administrative resources required to make it, actually increased. This is
because each decision was considered and reconsidered repeatedly. Higher
officials used their time to draft and redraft complicated decrees and
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instructions in alternative variants that were never approved. Lower officials
used their time to press for information about the progress of a decision that
was never made. The decision they wanted had no political significance; it
was of a technical nature that might be thought well suited to a committee of
experts. The problem was that the committee did not decide.
Delay and trade costs interacted. The Soviet officials that left the issues
for which they were personally accountable hanging in the air were
demonstrating indifference to heightened transaction costs. While they left
matters unresolved, officials and managers below them continued to avoid
responsibility where necessary, to work around the rules where possible, and
to take out the insurance that seemed to be recommended – to give time
and effort to lobbying Moscow for change. So, decision costs and trade costs
fed off each other. The officials that repeatedly delayed effective resolutions
tolerated this negative spiral.
From a system point of view, procrastination had one merit. What
appears to have happened is that senior managers postponed resolution for
several years, waiting until junior managers had found a workable
accommodation to the new regime. Then, they legislated in such a way as to
formalize this accommodation. There is no evidence that this happened by
design, but it is suggestive of the option value of wait-and-see.
The tendency to indecision belies the reputation of autocracies for
decisive action. While indecision can be found in any organization, it had
fewer restraints in the government of a closed society under a dictator.
Soviet officials answered only to superiors for their actions, and Stalin did not
have to account to anyone for his. Although this might seem to facilitate easy
decision making, it also created shelters for the indecisive.
In an open society, in contrast, indecision is visible, and voters and
markets can be unforgiving of decision makers that visibly fail to decide.
Democratic leaders must answer for the costs of government to voters,
including taxpayers, who can switch their votes to political rivals. Private
corporations in a competitive market economy answer for higher costs to the
buyer, who can switch business to a competitor. Because of such pressures,
political and economic organizations in open societies are more likely to
develop mechanisms to limit their own indecision.
Stalin had a clear idea of decision costs and the importance of efficient
control. By the nature of his regime, he could not apply the disciplines of
transparency and open competition. One of the few instruments available to
him was terror. But the application of terror intensified the fear of being
identified as accountable for decisions, and this exacerbated the problem of
indecision.
275. Conclusion
Comparisons of democracy and dictatorship suffer from an asymmetry.
Democratic business is done in public, and democracy’s transaction costs are
all too visible. Dictators do their business in secret, so their transaction costs
are hidden too. We get to see the evidence, only after regime change makes
their archives available.
This paper exploits archival evidence on transaction costs produced by an
exogenous shock to the Soviet government bureaucracy. The shock was
Stalin’s sudden tightening of secrecy in 1947, by which he aimed to deter
officials from engaging in the unauthorized exchange of information with
outsiders. This led to significant problems for the business of the Gulag in
1949 and 1950. It was not only unauthorized business that became more
costly. The new rules made all business more costly – authorized as well as
unauthorized. Higher costs hindered transactions that were previously
authorized and desired on both sides, and may have prevented some.
Business relationships were maintained, only to the extent that the
parties were willing to work around or ignore the new rules. In that context,
however, neglect of the rules was now more dangerous than before, because
the law of 1947 was explicitly aimed at secrecy violations committed without
intending harm the state. Those responsible for the business of the Gulag
tried to insure themselves by both implicating their superiors in the actions
they took to work around the rules, and lobbying for action to remove these
difficulties. Higher level responses were marked by indecision and delay. In
short, we observe that, when the level of government secretiveness was
markedly increased, both trade costs and decision costs rose.
Economic analysis suggests that, when higher costs are incurred willingly,
this is done to get some equal or greater expected benefit. If the Soviet rulers
were willing to face higher costs arising from secrecy, the question that
follows is: where was the commensurate payoff? The available documents do
not explicitly motivate either the classification of the identification and
location of labour camps as one of the most important secrets of the Soviet
Union, or the extra measures that strengthened their security. Instead, we
infer motivation from the context of the “KR” affair: Stalin was concerned to
limit the scope for sideline dealing.
Did Stalin reckon with the increase in trade and decision costs that
followed? He might have launched the intensification of secrecy because he
calculated that higher transactions costs would be compensated by a greater
reduction in sideline losses, or because he miscalculated. Without direct
evidence, we cannot be certain. This gives a sense of the gaps to be filled
before we can fully understand the scope and complexity of Soviet secrecy.
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